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Abstract. The computable model theory of modal logic was initiated by
Suman Ganguli and Anil Nerode in [4]. They use an effective Henkin-type
construction to effectivize various completeness theorems from classical modal
logic. This construction has the feature of only producing models whose frames
can be obtained by adding edges to a tree digraph. Consequently, this construc-
tion cannot prove an effective version of a well-known completeness theorem
which states that every S4.3.1-theory has a model whose accessibility relation
is a linear order of order type ω. We prove an effectivization of that theorem
by means of a new construction adapted from that of Ganguli and Nerode.
1. Introduction
First-order modal logic has a rich model theory [2, 6] and is of considerable
interest in philosophy [3], linguistics [7], and mathematics and computer science [6].
In view of these considerations, modal logic is an attractive candidate for a program
of research in computable model theory. This program of research was initiated by
Ganguli and Nerode in [4], who proved effective versions not only of the standard
modal completeness theorem but of several of the variations of the completeness
theorem unique to modal logic which guarantee for each decidable theory of a
specified class a decidable model of a specified class. Namely, they proved the
following theorems:
• every consistent, decidable theory has a decidable model;
• every consistent, decidable T-theory has a reflexive decidable model;
• every consistent, decidable K4-theory has a transitive decidable model;
• every consistent, decidable S4-theory has a reflexive and transitive decidable
model;
• every consistent, decidable K5-theory has a transitive and Euclidean decidable
model; and
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2 EFFECTIVE COMPLETENESS FOR S4.3.1
• every consistent, decidable S5-theory has a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric
decidable model.
(See Definition 2.7 for the definition of these classes of theories and the classes of
models they are intended to describe.) In addition, Ganguli and Nerode proved
that their Henkin-type construction is robust in the following ways: the theorems
remain true whether decidability of models is taken to require the decidability of
truth or the decidability of global truth (simultaneous truth in every world), and
they remain true whether the models are taken to have varying domains, constant
domains, or monotonic domains. However, the construction in every case builds
a branching tree of worlds to serve as the frame of the decidable model; the spe-
cialized theorems enumerated above are obtained by effectively adding edges to the
accessibility relation (see Definition 2.1). This raises the question of whether these
Henkin-type constructions are topologically robust, that is, whether a Henkin-type
construction can be carried out to prove effective completeness theorems involv-
ing models whose accessibility relation cannot be obtained by adding edges to a
branching tree.
We prove that in fact a Henkin-type construction, suitably modified, can be used
to prove an effective completeness theorem involving models whose accessibility
relations does not branch at all, yielding the following new theorem.
Theorem 1.1 (Effective Completeness for S4.3.1). Every decidable S4.3.1-theory
has a decidable linear model of order type ω.
This paper is organized as follows. In §2.1 we we give a concise but thorough
overview of the modal logic necessary to our proof. In §2.2 we will introduce the
system S4.3.1, including an exposition of its model theory which to our knowledge
has never appeared previously. In particular, we correct a longstanding error due
to Prior [9]. In §3 we prove Theorem 1.1. The proof depends on a Henkin-type
construction which produces linear models of order type ω. The objects defined at
each finite stage of the construction will be finite structures which approximate a
modal model in the same way that finite conjunctions approximate the diagram of
a classical first-order model in the classical Henkin construction. Because modal
operators quantify over possible worlds in much the same way that first-order quan-
tifiers quantify over elements in the domain, we will have to introduce two sorts
of Henkin witnesses: elements of the domain to witness existential sentences, as
in the classical construction; and possible worlds to witness possible sentences (i.e.
sentences of the form ♦θ). Since we wish to construct linear models, we will need
to take care that the worlds we introduce as this sort of Henkin witness maintain
the linearity of the structure; that is, as noted above, that the accessibility relation
does not branch.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Modal Logic. We begin with a standard description of first-order modal logic.
For a detailed introduction, see for example [2].
2.1.1. Syntax. A first-order modal language L is obtained by adding to a classical
first-order language L− the modal symbols ♦ and .1 The atomic formulae are
1For simplicity, we omit equality from the language. The only modification that needs to
be made to our construction if equality is present is the modification one would expect in any
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those of L−, and the well-formed formulae are obtained by adding to the standard
recursive definition the rule:
• if φ is a wff, then so are ♦φ and φ.
Informally, ♦φ asserts that φ is possibly true while φ asserts that φ is necessarily
true. The sense of the words “possibly” and “necessarily” can vary greatly (see
for example [2]) but is standardly formalized by a possible worlds semantics, given
below. In terms of possible worlds, ♦φ means that there exists a possible world
where φ is true, while φ means that φ is true at every possible world.
2.1.2. Semantics. For the following definitions, fix a first-order modal language L.
Definition 2.1. A Kripke frame is a pair F = (W,R), where W is a nonempty set
of possible worlds and R ⊆W ×W . R is called the accessibility relation of F .
The accessibility relation is meant to formalize the idea that one world is possible
from another: (w,w′) ∈ R means that w′ is possible or “accessible” from w. In
keeping with standard conventions, we identify a possible world with the set of
sentences true at that world.
Definition 2.2. A (constant domain) Kripke model2 is a quadruple (W,R,D, I),
where (W,R) is a Kripke frame, D is a nonempty set (the domain of the model),
and I is an interpretation of the relations and constants of L in D having the
following properties:
• for c a constant symbol, I(c) ∈ D;
• for w ∈W and P an n-ary predicate symbol, I(w,P ) ∈ Dn.
Given a Kripke model M = (WM , RM , DM , IM ), it is convenient to extend L to
a new language LM by adding for each d ∈ DM a constant cd naming d. Then we
expand M to an LM -model by taking IM (cd) = d for each d ∈ DM . This allows us
more easily to state the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (Truth at a World). If w is a world in the Kripke model M , we
write (M,w)  φ when φ is true at the world w in M . Truth is defined inductively
on the structure of φ:
• (M,w)  P (c0, . . . , cn) iff (I(c0), . . . , I(cn)) ∈ I(w,P );
• (M,w)  ¬φ iff (M,w) 2 φ;
• (M,w)  φ ∧ ψ iff (M,w)  φ and (M,w)  ψ;
• (M,w)  ∃xφ(x) iff (M,w)  φ(cd) for some d ∈ DM ;
• (M,w)  ♦φ iff (M,w′)  φ for some w′ ∈ WM such that (w,w′) ∈ RM ;
• (M,w)  φ iff (M,w′)  φ for all w′ ∈ WM such that (w,w′) ∈ RM .
Definition 2.4. A sentence φ is a theorem of M , written M  φ, if (M,w)  φ
for every w ∈WM .
If T is a set of sentences, we write M  T to mean that M  φ for each φ ∈ T .
Definition 2.5. We say that T entails φ, and write T  φ, if for every Kripke
model M  T , M  φ.
Henkin construction: the domain of the constructed model should be taken to be the set of Henkin
witnesses modulo equality. For the details of this modification in the modal logic case, see [4].
2We consider only constant domain models, but the construction we give may be adapted to
varying domain models and to monotonic domain models using, mutatis mutandis, the modifica-
tions for those cases described in [4].
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2.1.3. Deduction. The standard system of deduction in first-order modal logic is
normal modal logic, denoted K, which consists of all the inference rules and axiom
schema of first-order logic,3 plus the following rule and scheme:
• Rule of Necessitation: if φ is a theorem then φ is a theorem.
• Axiom of Distribution: (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ).
The soundness and completeness theorems hold between the semantics of Kripke
models given above and this deductive system.
2.1.4. Theories.
Definition 2.6. A theory is a deductively closed set of sentences.
Modal theories are classified according to whether they contain certain axiom
schema (or, equivalently, are closed under a new notion of deduction obtained by
including those axiom schema as logical axioms).
Definition 2.7. We define some standard classes of theories.
• K-theories are just theories, with no additional axioms required.
• T-theories contain the scheme φ→ φ.
• K4-theories contain the scheme φ→ φ.
• K5-theories contain the scheme ♦φ→ ♦φ.
• S4-theories contain the schemes of both T and K4.
• S5-theories contain the schemes of S4 and K5.
These classes of theories are usually referred to as systems. As stated in the
introduction, effective completeness theorems for each of these systems were proved
in [4].
2.2. The System S4.3.1. Arthur Prior [8] introduced the modal system D to
describe discrete time, i.e. time seen as a linear sequence of moments such that
for each moment, there is an earliest (if any) future moment and a latest (if any)
past moment. Such a conception of time, and hence the corresponding modal logic,
has proven useful in computer science (see e.g. [5]). System D was later renamed
to system S4.3.1 by Sobocin´ski [11]. As the name D presently designates another
modal system, the system of discrete time has retained Sobocin´ski’s nomenclature.
System S4.3.1 is obtained from K by adding the following axiom schema:
• T: φ→ φ
• 4: φ→ φ
• D2: (φ→ ψ) ∨(ψ → φ)
• N1: ((φ→ φ)→ φ)→ (♦φ→ φ)
Given axiom schema T and 4, axiom scheme D2 describes linear models, i.e. models
whose accessibility relation is a linear order; given the previous three schema, N1
describes discrete models, i.e. models whose accessibility relation has the order
type of an infinite subset of the integers.
In order to clarify them, we will verify the claims of the preceding paragraph
informally. Consider the temporal interpretation of φ as asserting that “φ is now
and always will be true,” i.e. that φ is true at the present moment and is true
at all presently possible future moments. On that reading, we have the following
understanding of the axiom schema D2 and N1.
3In Kripke models which are not constant domain models, one classical inference rule must be
omitted: φ(x) and ∀xφ(x) are not in general equivalent.
EFFECTIVE COMPLETENESS FOR S4.3.1 5
• D2
(φ → ψ) means that whenever φ is forever true, ψ is true; (ψ → φ)
means that whenever ψ is forever true, φ is true. For this to be false at some
world (moment) in a transitive, reflexive model, there would need to be a
possible future moment w1 at which φ was forever true while ψ was false, as
well as a possible future moment w2 at which ψ was forever true while φ is
false. This is impossible if (w1, w2) ∈ R or (w2, w1) ∈ R, so the accessibility
relation cannot be total. So given T and 4, to falsify D2 we require that the
accessibility relation not be a linear order.
• N1
♦φ → φ means that if sooner or later φ is forever true, then φ is presently
true; ((φ → φ) → φ) means that it is forever true that if whenever φ
becomes true it stays true forever, then φ is true. For this to be false at some
world in a model whose accessibility relation is a linear order, the following
would have to obtain: φ is false, sooner or later φ is forever true, and at
every future moment, either φ is true or φ will become true without being
forever true. Given that the accessibility relation is a reflexive linear order,
this requires that there be in our model a moment (world) at which φ is forever
true, but prior to which there is no latest moment at which φ is true and no
latest moment at which φ is false. So given T, 4, and D2, to falsify N1 we
require a subset of the accessibility relation to be dense.4
In light of the above considerations, the following theorem is not surprising. The
proof of the theorem was first given by Bull [1] using an algebraic semantics for
modal logic rather than the now standard Kripke possible world semantics outlined
in this paper; Segerberg [10] later supplied a proof using Kripke semantics.
Theorem 2.8 (Completeness for S4.3.1). The modal system S4.3.1 is complete
with respect to the class of models whose accessibility relation is a linear order of
order type ω.
Completeness theorems like this one in modal logic are usually proven using
a noneffective canonical model construction. While the usual proof strategy fails
in the case of Theorem 2.8 [2], its proof still relies on the canonical model con-
struction [10]. Moreover, any attempt to effectivize Theorem 2.8 using the effective
Henkin construction of [4] fails because that construction produces nonlinear mod-
els. In fact, whenever a sentence of the form ♦φ is added to a world w during the
construction, a new world w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ R is added to the model; and if
w′′ is another such world, then (w′, w′′) /∈ R.
Therefore in order to effectivize Theorem 2.8, we require a new Henkin construc-
tion. We supply such a construction in the next section.
4Historical note: the informal proof of this fact usually cited is that of Prior in [9], which is
incorrect. Prior proposes a countermodel in which φ is true at moment M and at every moment
thereafter, φ is false at every moment preceding M , and there is no latest moment preceding M .
Such a model in fact validates the instance of N1: at worlds where φ is false, both the antecedent
and the consequent of the axiom are false; and at worlds where φ is true, both the antecedent and
the consequent are true.
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3. Construction
Recall our goal: to prove that every decidable S4.3.1-theory has a decidable
model whose accessibility relation is of order type ω. Because we will be referring
repeatedly to such models, it is convenient to give them a less cumbersome name.
Definition 3.1. A Kripke model whose accessibility relation is a linear order of
order type ω is called a discrete linear model.
Our construction will build such a model in stages. At each finite stage, we will
have built a sort of finite approximation to the model. The following definition
makes this precise.
Definition 3.2.
(1) A finite Kripke diagram (FKD) for a modal language L is an ordered pair
(W = {w0, . . . , wn}, R), where W is a finite set of finite worlds (sets of L-
sentences) and R a binary relation on W . A linear FKD is a FKD where
{(wi, wj) : i+ 1 = j} ⊆ R ⊆ {(wi, wj) : i ≤ j}.
(2) Given a linear FKD D = (W = {w0, . . . , wn}, R), define
Ψn =
∧
{φ |φ ∈ wn}
and define by induction
Ψi =
∧
({φ |φ ∈ wi} ∪ {♦Ψj | (wi, wj) ∈ R})
for 0 ≤ i < n. We say that ΨD := Ψ0 is the representing formula of D.
At successive stages of the construction we will extend linear FKDs to larger
linear FKDs, with the intention that the desired model can be defined as a limit
of this construction. We therefore need to know whether these extensions are
“consistent” in the sense that we may in fact define such a limit model. It turns
out that the notion of consistency we need our FKDs to have is something a little
short of requiring them to embed into a model. The correct notion is supplied in
the following definition.
Definition 3.3.
(1) If D = (WD, RD) is a linear FKD, a discrete linear model M = (WM , RM ,
DM , IM ) in the same language is said to witness D by f if f :WD →WM is
a function such that (wi, wj) ∈ RD implies (f(wi), f(wj)) ∈ RM and φ ∈ wi
implies (M, f(wi))  φ.
(2) If T is an S4.3.1-theory, a linear FKD D is T -consistent if there exists a
discrete linear model M of T which witnesses D.
Given a decidable S4.3.1-theory T , we can determine effectively whether a given
linear FKD is T -consistent. This is the import of the next lemma. Before we state
the lemma, however, we have need of a new notation.
Definition 3.4. If T is a theory and φ a sentence in the language of T , we write
T l φ if φ holds in every discrete linear model of T .
Lemma 3.5 (Testing Lemma). For a linear FKD D = (WD = {w0, . . . , wn}, RD)
and a theory T , the following are equivalent:
(1) D is T -consistent;
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(2) T 2l ¬ΨD.
Observe that since T is complete, if we take T to be decidable we can determine
effectively whether (2) holds.
Proof.
• (1)⇒ (2).
Suppose that D is T -consistent, and let M be a discrete linear model witness-
ing D by f . The proof proceeds by induction.
By hypothesis, (M, f(wn))  φ for each φ ∈ wn, whence (M, f(wn))  Ψn.
Now suppose by way of induction that 0 ≤ i < n and (M, f(wi+1))  Ψi+1.
Then since (f(wi), f(wi+1)) ∈ RM and (M, f(wi+1))  Ψi+1, (M, f(wi)) 
♦Ψi+1. Since also (M, f(wi))  Ψi by the same reasoning applied above to
wn, it follows that (M, f(wi))  Ψi.
By induction, (M, f(wi))  Ψi for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and in particular
(M, f(w0))  Ψ
D. Thus we have a model of T satisfying ΨD; i.e. T 2l ¬Ψ
D.
• (2)⇒ (1).
Suppose that T 2l ¬ΨD, and letM = (WM , RM , DM , IM ) be a discrete model
and w ∈ WM a world of M such that (M,w)  ΨD. We will define a function
f :WD →WM by induction such that M witnesses D by f .
Set f(w0) = w. By hypothesis, (M,w)  Ψ0. Now suppose by way of
induction that we have defined f(wi) such that (M, f(wi))  Ψi. Since ♦Ψi+1
is among the conjuncts of Ψi, (M, f(wi))  ♦Ψi+1 and so there exists u ∈WM
such that (f(wi), u) ∈ RM and (M,u)  Ψi. Set f(wi) = u for some such u.
Since by induction (M, f(wi))  Ψi for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we observe that M
witnesses D by f .

It will greatly simplify the description of our construction if we define a notation
whereby if D is a FKD, D + {∗} denotes the modification of D by adding ∗ to it,
in the following precise sense.
Definition 3.6. If D = (WD = {wD0 , . . . , w
D
n }, RD) is a FKD and φ a sentence in
the language of D, define the following notations.
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ n, let D+ {φ ∈ wi} denote the FKD (W = {w0, . . . , wn+1}, RD),
where wi = w
D
i ∪ {φ} and wj = w
D
j for j 6= i.
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, let D + {wi} denote the FKD (W = {w0, . . . , wn+1}, R),
where
wj =


wDj , if j < i;
wi = ∅, if j = i;
wDj−1, if n+ 1 ≥ j > i;
and where
R = {(wj , wk) : j + 1 = k or wj = w
D
j∗ , wk = w
D
k∗ , (w
D
j∗ , w
D
k∗) ∈ RD}.
Thus D+{wi} is obtained by splicing a new world into the ith position among
the worlds in D.
• The two previous notations may be combined: for 0 ≤ i ≤ n+1, let D+{wi, φ ∈
wi} denote (D + {wi}) + {φ ∈ wi}.
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These notations may be repeated, so that D + {φ ∈ wi, ψ ∈ wj} denotes the
FKD obtained from D by adding φ to wDi and ψ to w
D
j . With this notation in
hand, we now begin the construction.
Construction 3.7. Let T be a consistent, decidable S4.3.1-theory in a first-order
modal language L. Fix a computable set of constants C absent from L and a
computable enumeration φ0, φ1, φ2, . . . of sentences in the expanded language L∪C.
Let pi : N→ N×N be a computable enumeration of pairs with the property that for
any given pair (i, e) ∈ N×N, there are infinitely many n ∈ N such that pi(n) = (i, e).
We will construct a discrete linear L-model M of T in stages. At stage −1 we
define the linear FKD D0 = ({w00 = ∅}, R0 = ∅). At stage n we have by induction
a linear FKD Dn = (Wn = {w
n
0 , . . . , w
n
p }, Rn). We will construct a linear FKD
Dn+1 which extends Dn as follows. Compute pi(n) = (i, e). If i > p, merely update
indices from n to n+ 1, i.e. set
Dn+1 = (Wn+1 = {w
n+1
0 , . . . , w
n+1
p }, Rn+1) = Dn,
and proceed to the next stage. If on the other hand i ≤ p, then let D denote
Dn + {φe ∈ wni } and check (decidably) whether T l ¬Ψ
D.
• If T l ¬Ψ
D, set Dn+1 = Dn + {¬φe ∈ w
n
i } and update indices from n to
n+ 1.
• If T 2l ¬ΨD, we consider several cases.
◦ If φe = ∃x θ(x), let Dn+1 = Dn + {φe, θ(cj) ∈ wni } where cj is the least
element of C not occurring in Dn, and update indices.
◦ If φe = ♦θ, we examine the following FKDs in order:
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , θ ∈ w
n
i },
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , wi+1, θ ∈ wi+1},
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , θ ∈ w
n
i+1},
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , wi+2, θ ∈ wi+2},
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , θ ∈ w
n
i+2},
...
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , wp−1, θ ∈ wp−1},
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , θ ∈ w
n
p },
Dn + {φe ∈ w
n
i , wp+1, θ ∈ wp+1}.
In each case we test whether T 2l ¬ΨD̂, where D̂ is the FKD in question.
If this is the case, we set Dn+1 = D̂ and update indices from n to n+1. If
not, we proceed to the next item in the list. We are guaranteed to obtain
a positive result from one of these tests because Dn is by induction T -
consistent and T has a discrete linear model.
◦ Otherwise, we set Dn+1 = Dn + {φe ∈ wni } and update indices.
Now we define a Kripke model M = (W,R,D, I):
• W =
{⋃
∞
n=1 w
n
i : w
n
i occurs in some Dn
}
;
• R =
{
(wi, wj) : w
n
i , w
n
j ∈Wn for some n, i ≤ j
}
;
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• D = C;
• and for an n-ary relation symbol P and n-tuple c¯ of elements of C, and any
world wi ∈W ,
c¯ ∈ I(wi)(P ) ⇔ P (c¯) ∈ wi.
Lemma 3.8 (Consistency Lemma). At each stage n of the Construction 3.7, Dn
is T -consistent.
Proof. The proof is by induction. To say that D0 is T -consistent is just to say that
T is consistent, which holds by hypothesis. Now suppose that we have shown Dn
to be T -consistent. We consider the possible cases.
• T l ¬ΨD. In this case, we chose Dn+1 = Dn + {¬φe ∈ wni }. Let M be
a discrete linear model witnessing Dn by f . By the Testing Lemma, D is
not T -consistent, so M cannot witness D. Hence (M, f(wni )) 2 φe and then
(M, f(wni ))  ¬φe. So M witnesses Dn+1 by f (subject to updated indices),
meaning Dn+1 is T -consistent.
• T 2l ¬ΨD. LetM = (WM , RM , DM , IM ) be a discrete linear model witnessing
D by f , so that in particular (M, f(wni ))  φe. We consider the possible cases.
◦ φe = ∃x θ(x). Then since (M, f (w
n
i ))  φe, there is an element a ∈ DM
such that (M, f (wni ))  θ(ca). Then (WM , RM , DM , I) witnesses Dn+1
by f (subect to updated indices), where I(cj) = a and I = IM otherwise.
So Dn+1 is T -consistent.
◦ φe = ♦θ. Since (M, f(wni ))  φe, there is a world u ∈ WM such that
(f(wni ), u) ∈ RM and (M,u)  θ. Fix such a world u ∈ WM and define
fˆ as follows.
fˆ
(
wn+1j
)
=


f
(
wnj
)
, if j < k;
u, if j = k;
f
(
wnj−1
)
, if p+ 1 ≥ j > k.
Then M witnesses Dn+1 by fˆ .
◦ Otherwise, Dn+1 = D with and so M witnesses Dn+1 by f (subject to
updated indices). So Dn+1 is T -consistent.

Lemma 3.9 (Closure Lemma). Let T , C, M , etc. be as in Construction 3.7. Then
for each wi ∈W :
(1) For each e, exactly one of φe or ¬φe is in wi.
(2) (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ wi iff φ ∈ wi and ψ ∈ wi.
(3) ∃x θ(x) ∈ wi iff tehere is some c ∈ C such that θ(c) ∈ wi.
(4) ♦θ ∈ wi iff there is some wj ∈ W such that (wi, wj) ∈ R and θ ∈ wj.
(5) θ ∈ wi iff θ ∈ wj for every wj ∈ W such that (wi, wj) ∈ R.
(6) T ⊆ wi.
Proof.
(1) Let n = (i, e) be such that wni ∈ Wn. By Construction 3.7, either φe ∈ w
n+1
i
or ¬φe ∈ w
n+1
i and so one or the other is in wi. Now suppose by way of
contradiction that φe,¬φe ∈ wi. Then φe,¬φe ∈ wni for some n. But then Dn
is not T -consistent, contrary to the Consistency Lemma.
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(2) • (⇒). Suppose by way of contradiction that (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ wi but that one
of φ, ψ is not in wi. For definiteness suppose φ /∈ wi. Then ¬φ ∈ wi, so
(φ ∧ ψ),¬φ ∈ wni for some n. But then Dn is not T -consistent. Hence
φ ∈ wi.
• (⇐). Suppose by way of contradiction that φ, ψ ∈ wi but that (φ ∧ ψ) /∈
wi. Then ¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ wi, and so φ, ψ,¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ wni for some n. But
then Dn is not T -consistent.
(3) • (⇒). Suppose ∃x θ(x) ∈ wi. Then at whichever stage n of Construction 3.7
∃x θ(x) was added to wni , θ(c) was added also, for some c ∈ C.
• (⇐). Suppose by way of contradiction that θ(c) ∈ wi for some c ∈ C but
that ∃x θ(x) /∈ wi. Then ¬∃x θ(x) ∈ wi, so θ(c),¬∃x θ(x) ∈ wni for some
n. But then Dn is not T -consistent.
(4) • (⇒). Suppose ♦θ ∈ wi. Then at some stage n of Construction 3.7 ♦θ
was added to wni , and at the same stage a new world w
n+1
j was added
such that θ ∈ wn+1j and j ≥ i. Therefore θ ∈ wj and (wi, wj) ∈ R.
• (⇐). Suppose by way of contradiction that (wi, wj) ∈ R and θ ∈ wj , but
that ♦θ /∈ wi. Then ¬♦θ ∈ wi, so θ ∈ wnj , ¬♦θ ∈ w
n
i , and i ≤ j for some
n. But then Dn is not T -consistent.
(5) • Suppose by way of contradiction that θ ∈ wi but that θ /∈ wj for some
j ≥ i. Then θ ∈ wni ,¬θ ∈ w
n
j , and i ≤ j for some n. But then Dn is
not T -consistent.
• Suppose θ /∈ wi. Then ¬θ ∈ wi and hence ♦¬θ ∈ wi (otherwise,
¬θ,¬♦¬θ ∈ wni for some n, implyingDn is not T -consistent). Therefore
there is j ≥ i such that ¬θ ∈ wj , and therefore θ /∈ wj .
(6) Suppose by way of contradiction that φ ∈ T but φ /∈ wi. Then ¬φ ∈ wi, so
¬φ ∈ wni for some n. But since any model M witnessing Dn by f is a model
of T , this implies that Dn is not T -consistent.

Lemma 3.10 (Truth Lemma). Let T , C, M be as in Construction 3.7. Then for
each wi ∈ W and each φ ∈ L ∪ C,
(M,wi)  φ ⇔ φ ∈ wi.
Proof. The proof is by induction. If φ is atomic, the equivalence in the lemma holds
by definition of I. Now suppose that the equivalence holds for α, β. We consider
the inductive cases.
• (M,wi)  (α∧β) iff (M,wi)  α and (M,wi)  β iff α, β ∈ wi by the inductive
hypothesis, iff (α ∧ β) ∈ wi by the Closure Lemma.
• (M,wi)  ¬α iff (M,wi) 2 α iff α /∈ wi by the inductive hypothesis, iff ¬α ∈ wi
by the Closure Lemma.
• (M,wi)  ∃xα(x) iff (M,wi)  α(c) for some c ∈ C iff α(c) ∈ wi for some
c ∈ C by the inductive hypothesis, iff ∃xα(x) ∈ wi by the Closure Lemma.
• (M,wi)  ♦α iff (M,wj)  α for some j ≥ i iff α ∈ wj by the inductive
hypothesis, iff ♦α ∈ wi by the Closure Lemma.
• (M,wi)  α iff (M,wj)  α for every j ≥ i iff α ∈ wj for every j ≥ i by the
inductive hypothesis, iff α ∈ wi by the Closure Lemma.

Corollary 3.11. Let T , M be as in Construction 3.7. Then M  T .
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Corollary 3.12. For each wi ∈ W and each φ ∈ T , φ ∈ wi by the Closure Lemma
and therefore (M,wi)  φ by the Truth Lemma.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.1 (Effective Completeness for S4.3.1). Every decidable S4.3.1-theory
has a decidable linear model of order type ω.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Fix a consistent, decidable S4.3-theory T . Let M be the
Kripke model produced by Construction 3.7.
• By Corollary 12, M is a model of T .
• Since R =
{
(wi, wj) : w
n
i , w
n
j ∈Wn for some n, i ≤ j
}
, M is linear.
• Fix wi, wj ∈W . Since (wi, wj) ∈ R iff i ≤ j, R is decidable.
• Fix φ ∈ L ∪ C and wi ∈ W . To decide whether (M,wi)  φ, search through
the enumeration φ0, φ1, . . . to find the index e such that φ = φe. Then search
through the stages n of Construction 3.7 such that pi(n) = (i, e) to find the
stage at which one of φe,¬φe is added to wni . Then φ ∈ wi iff φe is added to
wni , iff (M,wi)  φ by the Truth Lemma. Such an n can be found decidably,
so truth at a world in M is decidable.

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